In this paper we explore political-economic determinants of health. We draw upon the unique natural experiment of post-communist transitions to show the effect on health (measured as life expectancy and cause-specific mortality) of the interaction between institutions for political (democratic rules) and economic (free market entry) competitiveness. To analyze this relationship empirically, we employ panel regression analysis with country and time fixed effects. We find that, ceteris paribus, political and economic institutions exert cumulative positive impact upon health (even if their separate effects are negative or insignificant). One potential causal pathway is that political-economic liberalization increases certainty and people start investing in their health. Our findings are highly relevant to other countries that experience similar reforms.
Introduction
In the 1990s, post-Soviet republics (Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus) witnessed an unprecedented fall in male life expectancy and still falls short of the 1980s' level, while most Eastern European countries have enjoyed constant improvement in male life expectancy growth.
Much of this divergence is attributed to the pace of economic reform, healthcare systems, and alcohol consumption patterns (Bobak and Marmot, 1996; Leon et al., 2010; Marmot and Bobak, 2000; McKee, 1991; Shkolnikov, Cornia, Leon and Mesle, 1998; Stuckler, King and McKee, 2009 ). However, despite much interdisciplinary, scholarly effort, the large variation in these countries' health trends remains unexplained with the existing empirical results being mixed at best.
Political science literature, however, seems more divided on the implications of the rapid economic reforms. Faster economic liberalization is often associated with higher economic growth and lower inflation (for example, De Melo, Denizer and Gelb, 1996) . In addition, on a related, but conceptually different question about the relationship between economic liberalization and democratization, some scholars claim that abrupt economic reforms may buttress democratization, whereas others posit that they may impede democratization. (For an excellent literature overview, see Fish and Choudhry, 2007) .
Changes in the political realm were no less tectonic than in the economic realm and were shown to influence health outcomes. Yet, the positive impact of democracy on health outcomes is far from being orthodoxical. The recent study by Mackenbach, Hu, and Looman (2013) firmly established the importance of political determinants, in particular, democratization, along with other socio-economic factors, on population health in a "transitional" period. Their findings were largely consistent with the broader consensus in political science literature that democracy as such or democratic stock, (democracy age), exerts a positive impact upon health outcomes measured as life expectancy, infant mortality rate (IMR), and health-adjusted life years (HALE) (Baum and Lake, 2001; Besley and Kudamatsu, 2006; Franco, Alvarez-Dardet and Ruiz, 2004; Ghobarah, Huth, and Russett, 2004; Lake and Baum, 2003; Lin, Chen, Chien, and Chan, 2012; Mackenbach, Hu, and Looman, 2013; Muntaner, Borrell, Chung, Espelt, and Rodriguez-Sanz, 2011; Vollmer and Ziegler, 2009; Zweifel and Navia, 2003; Gerring et al., 2012; McGuire, 2013; Wigley and Akkoyunlu-Wigley, 2011) . In stark contrast, other scholars posit that such influence is either minuscule or absent (Shandra, Nobles, London, and Williamson, 2004; Ross, 2006; Muntaner et al., 2011; Pande, 2003) .
At this point it is useful to emphasize that one of the prominent features of the postcommunist transitions that distinguish them, perhaps, from all other transformations of a similar scope, is the simultaneity of economic and political wide-ranging reforms (Dabrowski and Gortat, 2002 ; European Bank of Reconstruction and Development [EBRD] Report, 2013; Firdmuc, 2003; Giavazzi and Tabellini, 2005; Melzig, Pleva, and Sprout, 2005; Staehr, 2006) .
Although Balzerowizc (1994) explicitly stated that political pluralism preceded market reforms, he admitted the simultaneity of reforms in its broadest sense:
In all other cases of radical transition, there was either a focus on the political system while the economic system remained basically unchanged (as in classical and neoclassical transitions) or a focus on the economy while the political regime (usually nondemocratic) was unaffected (p. 76). As a result, it is uncertainty in most important elements of the political regime -actors' positions and institutions -that defines transition period (Bunce, 1993) . Surprisingly few studies, however, address the question as to whether political and economic liberalization reinforce each other's effect on various policy outcomes. As Giavazzi and Tabellini (2005) shrewdly observed, '…economic and political liberalizations have been studied separately, thus missing the possibility that the two might interact ' (p. 3) . Most of these studies find a positive association between interaction term and economic performance (EBRD Transition Report, 2013; Firdmuc, 2003; Giavazzi and Tabellini, 2005; Melzig et al., 2005) . In addition, inclusion of an interaction term between political and economic liberalization into research design proves useful in uncovering a puzzle of a negative association between democratization and economic performance that is often found in the literature (e.g., Firdmuc, 2003) . One of Firdmuc's conlclusions specifically states that "... democracy alone, when not accompanied by correspondingly far-reaching liberalization, may have had a negative effect on growth during the early part of transition" (Firdmuc, 2003: 599) . In a related, but conceptually different, strand of literature, observers argue that balanced economic and political opportunities mitigate corruption (e.g., Sun and Johnston, 2009 ). However, none of these studies tested the interaction effect of political and economic liberalization upon health outcomes. More importantly, most of these studies, save for the EBRD Transition Report 2013, tended to focus on economic indicators such as the extent of economic openness (Giavazzi and Tabellini, 2005) , the scope of mass privatization (Stuckler, King, and McKee, 2009) , or the liberalization index composed as an unweighted mean of eight transition indicators elaborated by EBRD, all of which are policy outcomes rather than institutional foundations, and therefore fail to test an impact of institutionalization per se.
We see a compelling need to fill this gap and to propose an overarching, institutional theory of health for states in transition. We depart from the previous studies in several ways. In this paper, we do not intend to answer whether democratization causes economic growth.
Neither do we claim to explore how the sequence of reforms-whether democratization precedes economic liberalization or vice versa-affects health outcomes, which is itself an important question and researchable subject. The goal of this study is two-fold: first, to appreciate the role of institutionalization of both processes, (this is democratization and economic liberalization, which is often either overlooked or assumed to be the same process, but is not (Giavazzi and Tabellini, 2005) ) and second, to explore whether the interaction of institutionalization of political and economic liberalization affects population health. To anticipate our findings, simultaneous institutionalization of political and economic competitiveness exerts a large positive independent effect upon health outcomes.
To the point, we argue that the development of institutions for political (for example democratic rules) and economic competitiveness (for example free market entry) exert cumulative positive impact upon health (even if their separate effects are negative or insignificant) because only their combination may efficiently decrease overall uncertainty engendered by transition and thereby encourage citizens to invest in their health.
3 They do so by preventing uncertainty, and thus "health-ruining" processes such as reckless political competition, rent-seeking, power usurpation, bandit capitalism, and oligarchization.
We test our hypotheses empirically using a multivariate time-series cross-sectional (TSCS) regression analysis with country and time fixed effects covering the 1989-2011 period.
However, the time range might vary across different model specifications depending on data availability, especially for confounders. Data on life expectancy at birth, IMR, age-standardized cause-specific mortality rates, politico-economic conditions, and potential confounding variables were compiled from the existing data sources (HFA; Eurostat; Demoscope Database; EBRD transition indicators; Quality of Governance Dataset). The results largely corroborated our hypothesis.
Organizationally, Section 2 of this paper presents our main theoretical argument that simultaneous institutionalization of democratization and economic liberalization processes lead to most optimal health outcomes. Section 3 offers a potential causal pathway that these processes decrease overall uncertainty during transition, which inter alia encourages citizens to invest in health and leads to improved health outcomes. Section 3 devises an alternative research design for testing our main propositions as well as describes variables and data sources in detail. Section 4 provides our main regression analysis results that largely corroborate our hypothesis. Section 5 places our argument into broader political context and evaluates whether our theory is relevant to analyzing the so called "hybrid regimes". Section 6 presents certain limitations of the research, summarizes our main conclusions and policy implications.
Theory
The essential feature of all post-communist transitions was the introduction of some degree of competitiveness in both political and economic spheres. In general, according to the EBRD Report of 1995, by that year the most successful countries had passed and amended competition laws and broke up major cartels (like Hungary), whereas slow reformers were only starting to consider competition law (like Georgia). Timing and progress in democratization also reveals much variation. Whereas the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovenia had become fullblown democracies by 1993, Russia and Georgia remained somewhere in between. Belarus and most Central Asian republics either successfully retained or slid back to authoritarianism. In addition, although in most cases political institutions were built hand in hand with economic institutions, there is much variation in the degree of simultaneity in conducting those reforms (see Figure 1 ). Although the positive role of economic and political competition, both for a country's overall development and its health performance in particular, is highly appreciated in the literature (Stigler, 1987; Nickell, 1996; Schumpeter, 1942; Easterly and Levine, 2000; North, 1990; Acemoglu, Naidu, Restrepo, and Robinson, 2014; World Development Report, 2002) , it is widely recognized that competition per se, if not buttressed by certain institutions (e.g., rule of law, enforcement agencies, etc.), not only fails to produce the right incentives for political and economic agents, but may actually lead to perverse outcomes (e.g., Popov 2007) . In fact, this is exactly the institutional trap that many post-communist countries fell into at their early transition stages, namely, cut-throat political and economic competition was already in place, while both promoting and constraining institutions were still absent.
Popov (2007) In this paper, we argue that the best health results should be achieved when the process of building market institutions is coupled with the process of building institutions for political competitiveness, that is, democratization. Introducing competition, either political or economic, means that more players participate in the "game" now. However, if the rules of the game are ill defined and/or serve to the advantage of "the strongest", or are simply absent, the outcomes are distorted as well. Put simply, rampant competition without institutions easily transforms into an "unfair" contestation, creates certain loopholes for rent-seeking behavior, corruption, unjust workers' layouts, misallocation of resources, including human capital, and thus aggravates overall uncertainty. By this token, it is reasonable to argue that if institutions are built along one dimension (i.e., economic competition), but not the other (i.e., democratization), the existing loopholes in the sphere that lacks properly functioning institutions will be utilized to their maximum capacity, and overall outcomes will be inferior. For instance, even if both political and economic competition are introduced, but institutions work properly only in the economic sphere (say, prices are liberalized, monopolies are broken, and competitiveness laws are adopted, but elections are marred with fraud to the extent that they become meaningless) politicians will most probably resort to their administrative capacity to distort the flow of both political and economic rents (the two are easily convertible) to their own advantage and to the detriment of the society as a whole. Precisely because competitiveness allows more people to take part in the process, the aggregate scope (say, the monetary expression of corruption) increases as well.
In this paper, we test a hypothesis that, all else equal, only the interaction of institutions for political and economic competitiveness positively affects health outcomes. Thus, we anticipate that the best health results should be achieved if a country simultaneously advances its institutions for political and economic competitiveness when the degree if uncertainty reaches its minimum, while the worst may be expected if neither is developed when uncertainty soars.
To illustrate our theory more vividly, we plot dynamic trends of development of institutions for both political and economic competitiveness ( Figure 1 ). We identify several categories, including (a) advanced economic and democratic development, (b) low economic and democratic development, (c) low economic and high democratic development, and (d) average economic and moderate democratic development. Although the graphs seem to confirm our story, compelling conclusions can be drawn only after performing more rigorous tests that take into account other important factors, which we present in the next section.
[ Figure 1 here]
Causal pathway: uncertainty reduces investment in health
Given the broad nature of liberalizing political-economic processes, it is difficult to discern one clear channel through which such changes might influence health outcomes. The most common causal pathways include rapid pace of transition, large-scale privatization and related high unemployment rates (Cornia and Paniccia, 2000; Stuckler, King and McKee 2009) 4 ; stress caused by economic and political reforms (Brainerd, 2001; Leon and Shkolnikov, 1998) ; the collapse of the Soviet health system and poor quality of medical care (Balabanova et al., 2004; Ellman 1994) ; alcohol consumption (Leon et al 2010; Bhattacharya, Gathmann and Miller, 2011) ; ill-designed alcohol pricing policy (Treisman, 2010) ; impoverishment and rising social inequalities (Ivaschenko, 2005; Bobak et al., 1998) .
On the one hand, it can be claimed that the absence of institutions for economic and political competitiveness might appear at the root of most processes that were earlier proved to influence health outcomes. In fact, as our empirical results demonstrate, if development of political and economic institutions takes divergent trajectories, their potential positive effectsif taken separately-are significantly reduced. Uninstitutionalized and, as a result, rampant and unfair competition penetrates systemic as well as individual levels and may affect health outcomes through various channels. However, we go further and attempt to identify the most plausible channels of influence. We hypothesize that uninstitutionalized political-economic liberalization will act first and foremost through the mechanism of uncertainty and the resulting under-investment in health capital. For example, Abbot, Wallace and Beck (2006) while analyzing the impact of the Chernobyl disaster on citizens in nearby areas come to the conclusion that "unlike in other disasters, the perception of uncertainty among informants is linked, not only to the incident itself, but also economic problems and the institutional disintegration of the USSR" (Abbot, Wallace and Beck, 2006: 119) .
The external uncertainty in general has been demonstrated to adversely affect citizens' decision to invest in their own health (for example Asano and Shibata, 2011) . The authors show through formal modeling that uncertainty about the efficiency of healthcare in the country tends to reduce citizens' stimuli to invest in their health. This is especially relevant to the postcommunist states where healthcare systems performed poorly (Balabanova et al., 2004) . We argue that divergent political and economic transformation paths increase the overall uncertainty among citizens, which discourages them from making long-term investments in health capital.
5
To make matters worse, this feeling of uncertainty about the future is coupled with the specific beliefs of a "Soviet man" whereby the state is solely responsible for a person's health, which induces fatalism and reduces incentives for investment in health (on ideology and healthy lifestyle in post-Soviet republics, see Cockerham et. al., 2006) .
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Research Design and Data
Data
Our main dependent variables are represented by both broad indicators such as life expectancy at birth as well as less aggregate health measures such as age standardized mortality by causes of death. It is important to calculate models for both sexes separately due to the extraordinary gender gaps in life expectancy as well as cause-specific mortality rates typical for Eastern Europe (Murray and Bobadilla, 1997; Weidner and Cain, 2003; Leon, 2011; Clark and Peck, 2012; Mackenbach, Karanikolos, and McKee, 2013) . Life expectancy at birth is widely used as a reliable and easily interpretable indicator of mortality (see Preston, Heuveline and Guillot, 2001) . Disaggregating health measures, although less reliable, allow better identification of intervening mechanisms through which socio-political processes influence health outcomes (Mackenbach, Hu and Looman, 2013) .
We include death rates that are believed to be caused by social stress, uncertainty, and insecure living conditions. These are circulatory diseases and suicides. To avoid the effect of long-term chronic illness we take the mortality level at the age 0-64. Age standardized mortality data by causes of death are also extracted from the WHO Health for All Database. Age-standardization is performed using the direct method and the European standard population. The database for causes of death fails to cover the whole period of observations for all countries in the sample, especially after 2011, therefore we chose to restrict the timeframe of analysis to 1989-2010.
The main independent variables of interest-institutions for political and economic competitiveness-are measured as Polity IV democracy score and competition policy indicator, respectively. Despite the existence of many alternative political regime measures, Polity IV, although with its own drawbacks, is most popular among scholars because of its extensive crosscountry, time span coverage as well as its sensitive 21-point scale. The data are compiled by the Polity IV project (http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm) and extracted from the Quality of Government dataset (Teorell, Samanni, Holmberg, and Rothstein, 2011) (http://www.qog.pol.gu.se/data/). The Polity2 index is normally distributed on a continuous scale from "strongly democratic" (+10) to "strongly autocratic" (-10). We followed Mackenbach, Hu, and Looman (2013) and rescaled the index to make it entirely positive ranging from 0 to 20.
The Competition policy indicator is one of the EBRD Transition Indicators
(http://www.ebrd.com/russian/pages/research/economics/data/macro/ti_methodology.shtml) that was introduced in 1989 to assess country-specific progress in transition. For the purpose of this study, we employed an economic competition policy indicator that evaluates change from a rigid centrally planned economy to an industrialized market economy and that ranges from 1 to 4+.
More specifically, 1 corresponds to no competition legislation and institutions; 2 corresponds to competition policy legislation and institutions set up, with some reduction of entry restrictions or enforcement action on dominant firms; 3 corresponds to some enforcement actions to reduce abuse of market power and to promote a competitive environment, including break-ups of dominant conglomerates and substantial reductions of entry restrictions; and 4 corresponds to significant enforcement actions to reduce abuse of market power and to promote a competitive environment; 4+ corresponds to standards and performance typical of advanced industrial economies, with effective enforcement of competition policy and unrestricted entry to most markets (http://www.ebrd.com/pages/research/economics/data/macro/ti_methodology.shtml).
Consistent with our theory, competition policy is one of the two indices, along with governance and enterprise restructuring, that has an institutional flavor. All others (i.e., price liberalization, trade and Forex system, small-and large-scale privatization) reflect policy outcomes rather than certain political and economic institutions (EBRD Transition Report, 2013: 39) . In our view, high scores on aggregated indices might be driven solely by high indices on policy implementation outcomes (e.g., privatization), which not only ignores the influence of institutions per se, but also might prompt a misleading interpretation. To test our theory that institutions for both political and economic competitiveness should exert an important combined effect upon health outcomes, we created their interaction term by multiplying the democratization score and an economic policy competition indicator. To further test our specific causal pathway, we explore the association between investments in health (proxy by private health expenditures as a percentage by GDP) and certain stress-related health outcomes. We also controlled for a number of country characteristics that are found in the literature to associate with democracy, competition policy, and life expectancy, and, therefore, may act as confounders. We controlled for time-invariant confounders by using country-fixed effects models, and for time-variant confounders by explicitly including them in our regression Albania and some Central Asian republics demonstrated an unexpected low level of mortality that can be explained by behavior specifics (Gjonca, Wilson, and Falkingham, 1997; Gjonca and Bobak, 1997) or underestimation (Wuhib et al, 2003; Boyle and Ferlay, 2005; Guillot et al, 2011; 2013) . Thus, the real figures of life expectancy could be a bit lower. A similar situation with Albania and Middle Asia can be observed in Azerbaijan where there are less risky behavior patterns-alcohol consumption (Wasserman and Varnik, 1998; Rehn, Room, and Edwards, 2001 ) and failures in statistics, especially in case of child mortality. More or less high life expectancy fluctuations in Georgia and Armenia are also explained by the underestimation of migration and overestimation of total country population (Badurashvili et al., 2001; Duthé et al., 2010) . The similar problems are present in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Moldova, and probably in Albania.
Descriptive statistics on dependent and independent variables can be found in Appendix.
Methods
In recognition of the dynamic nature of the examined processes, we perform crosssection time-series regression analysis on the unbalanced panel data covering 29 countries over 23 years . For the whole time period, we use states in their modern borders with the exception of Serbia and Montenegro, for which the data are common until 1999 and separate thereafter (for "Serbia" and "Montenegro"). Although some models are run on a reduced sample-mostly due to the lack of data on certain dependent and control variables, especially for the former Yugoslavian and Central Asian Republics-our results stay intact.
To mitigate against omitted variable bias, we use most important confounders identified in the literature as well as country fixed effects clustered by states. To capture possible external shocks, we control for time trend (both as a continuous and dummy variable). Robust standard errors are calculated in order to tackle a heterogeneity and first-order autocorrelation problem (Wooldridge, 2006 ). Our main model takes the following form:
where health outcome is measured by life expectancy at birth or age-adjusted specific-cause mortality rates, democracy is represented by a rescaled Polity score, economic competition is represented by EBRD transition economic policy indicator, gni refers to GDP per capita, PPP, logged. Other confounders include average years of schooling, numbers of armed conflicts, alcohol consumption, and income inequality for most model specifications. Time is represented by time trend or time dummies, country dummies control for unobserved confounding, and subscripts i and j represent time and country.
To check for our causal pathway, we attempt to assess the influence of degree of uncertainty (proxied as interaction term between economic liberalization and democratization) on a) stress-related health outcomes (proxied as mortality from cerebrovascular diseases and suicides because they are believed to be caused by stress) and b) investments in health capital (private health expenditures as % of GDP). Indeed, the specialists in occupational sciences showed the high role of uncertainty as a trigger of stress (Bodensteiner, Gerloff and Quick 1989;Pollard, 2011). Also, stress was shown to account for much mortality crisis in the postSoviet space (e.g., see Leon and Shkolnikov, 1998, on Russia) . To accommodate for such possibility, we use cardiovascular diseases (CVD) and suicides as our dependent variables. Men often react to stress with hostility, anger and violence abuse, women react with anxiety and adverse moods (Aneshensel et al., 1991) that are important causes of CVD and suicides (e.g., Cougle et al 2009; Gullette et al, 1997; Pickering, 2001 ). Our results confirm that uncertainty played a significant role in impacting health outcomes in post-communist countries. Table 1 presents results for the benchmark models with the dependent variable-life expectancy at birth for males and females. Generally, competition policy and democracy are negatively related to life expectancy, while their interaction, as hypothesized, exerts a strong statistically significant effect and is positively signed.
Results
[ Table 1 [ Figure 2 here]
The discovered negative association between democracy and life expectancy might be attributed to increased uncertainty (i.e., higher probability of reforms reversal due to political backlash) as well as to short-term political goals that at times of transitions often overrode the economic interests of the society (e.g., Firdmuc, 2003) . The negative effect of institutions for liberalizing economic reforms may be explained by the partial nature of reforms with these very institutions protecting rents and property rights of the "early winners" (e.g., oligarchs, rather than society as a whole) (Hellman, 1998) . Such reforms may have had detrimental effect upon economic development and, as a result, upon health outcomes. The only control variable that gained statistical significance is a proxy for inequality implying that, all else equal, a larger income gap in the society reduces male life expectancy. Table 2 presents TSCS regression analysis with stress-related indicators. As predicted by our theoretical propositions, the interaction term exerts statistically significant and negative impact upon both circulatory system diseases and suicides even after controlling for numerous confounders. Substantively, the higher the level of uncertainty created by the mismatch of institutionalization in political and economic spheres, the higher the death rates caused by CVD and suicides.
[ Table 2 here]
The effect of interaction between democratization and economic liberalization on the healthcare expenditures (see Table 3 ) is positive and significant for total health expenditures by PPP and private health expenditures as a % of GDP 7 .
We take courage and interpret these results as tentative evidence for our proposition that uncertainty created by divergent paths of democratization and economic liberalization reduces citizens' stimuli to invest in health.
[ Table 3 here]
Robustness checks
We tested the robustness of our models by including additional confounders such as spirits consumption (40% of pure alcohol equivalent) as opposed to the total alcohol consumption (Leon et al., 2010; Zaridze et al., 2009 ) and tertiary education enrollment instead of average years of schooling 8 . We also experimented with certain lags and different regression models (specifically, we estimate alternative models by feasible generalized least squares (FGLS).
In the model specifications below we control for spirits consumption (40% of pure alcohol equivalent) as opposed to total alcohol consumption. The rationale behind is that it is spirits consumption that is often considered most detrimental for certain health indicators (e.g., Leon et al., 2010; Zaridze et al., 2009; 2014) . We report our results in Table 4 . The independent variables of interest retain their sign and statistical significance.
[ Table 4 here] Models in Table 5 essentially replicate those in Table 4 , but utilize cause-specific mortality rates as dependent variables. The results for the interaction term largely stay robust after including spirits consumption into the model.
[ Table 5 here] 7 We choose to take institutional variables with 5-year lag because healthcare reform is a long-term process. Also, the reliable data on healthcare expenditures are available only since 1995. 8 In the Soviet Union, life expectancy of people with tertiary education was increasing, while the total life expectancy was decreasing (Vishnevsky and Shkolnokov, 1997) .
Models in Table 6 demonstrate the positive and statistically significant effect of the interaction term between democratization and economic competition on life expectancy after we control for tertiary education enrollment instead of average years of schooling.
[ Table 6 here]
As an additional robustness check, we re-estimate our main models using FGLS (Feasible General Least Squares) that also tackles heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation problems present in the data. Table 8 shows that for the large part the impact of our variables of interest as well as their interaction term stay robust to different model specifications.
[ Table 7 here]
The interaction term within FGLS models that utilize cause-specific mortality rates as dependent variables retains the predicted sign and statistical significance in most model specifications with only few exceptions when it becomes only marginally significant (see Table   8 ).
[ Table 8 here]
Since the effect of institutions for political and economic competitiveness on health outcomes might not be immediate, it is necessary to re-estimate our models with lagged independent variables. We specify two models lagging our main independent variables by 1 year and 3 years (see Table 9 given 1) the rapid institutional building in post-communist states, and 2) short observation time span in our models. For the most part, the results remain unchanged.
[ Table 9 here]
Reaching Out to Broader Political Context
Our study also complements the broader political science literature on the so-called "hybrid" regimes (see Levitsky and Way (2002) for a comprehensive review). We abstain here from the debate on what exactly constitutes such regimes, and for the purpose of this paper it suffices to note that two important features-institutional deficit and/or presence of certain features that undermine otherwise "meaningful" formal institutions-are recognized as a central feature of such political regimes (Gerring et al., 2012; Levitsky and Way, 2002; Keefer 2007) .
Such features often imply massive electoral fraud (e.g., intimidation, ballot stuffing, other types of manipulations by authorities), human rights violation, media censorship, protection of the political status quo by illegal means, state capture by vested interests, and others (Levitsky and Way, 2010) .
This conceptualization seems highly relevant for studying post-communist transitions, which are of primary interest for this paper, because the Post-Soviet space can be rightly called the champion among other world regions in hosting hybrid regimes. Seven in Central Europe (Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia) and six in the former Soviet Union (Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Russia, Ukraine) were categorized as competitive authoritarian regimes at certain times in their history (most of them either became or already were competitive authoritarian between 1990 and 1995) (Levitsky and Way, 2010) .
Our contribution to this literature is two-fold. First, our results confirm the theoretical predictions that hybrid regimes often fail to reach efficiency in public policies, in particular, in reaching optimal health outcomes. More importantly, given that "hybrid regimes" appear at stable equilibrium (Levitsky and Way, 2010) , which characterizes by the high degree of uncertainty, the prospects for health outcomes under such regimes remain doomed. Second, we identify an additional institutional shortfall of such regimes. Not only is it of importance that institutions for economic and political competitiveness are absent or act as a mere disguise for protecting "the privileged", but also that a mismatch in the pace of building these institutions matters.
Our empirical results predict that the failure of many post-communist countries to build simultaneously competitive political and economic institutional infrastructure is responsible for undesirable health outcomes. Consistent with our conclusions, the "hybrid" regimes are repeatedly shown to fare worse on many other public policy outcomes in comparison to their democratic and, in some cases, even authoritarian counterparts. They are more prone to heightened corruption (see Rock, 2008) , to clientelism and policy noncredibility (Keefer, 2007) , violence, and state failure (Gates et al, 2006; Robertson, 2007; Snyder and Mansfield, 1995) .
Limitations
The most important empirical result of the paper is establishing the statistical significance of the effect on health in the post-communist countries of uncertainty measured as the interaction between institutionalized political and economic competitiveness. To test the hypothesis, the panel-structured data and appropriate methods were employed. However, there are several important limitations to our analysis. First, reservations should be made about the choice of dependent variables and their reliability. Life expectancy data are subject to temporal effects and specific-cause mortality rates are of questionable quality (Mackenbach, Hu, and Looman, 2013) .
However, we hope the fact that our results are robust to using several alternative dependent variables mitigates against this drawback. Second, the data on both dependent and independent variables contain missing values. To economize on space, we discuss these problems and how we deal with them in greater detail in Appendix. Third, there is a possibility that the effect of the reforms is not immediate. Empirically, we partially handle the problem by lagging our independent variables by 1 and 3 years (see also Appendix). Fourth, in this paper we focus on post-communist states as opposed to the whole world, which limits generalizability of our results. We prefer to view this as a strength of our study: post-communist transitions present a unique historical experiment to test efficiency of simultaneous political and economic reforms.
Future researchers, however, are precluded from further extrapolating these results without additional empirical testing. Lastly, we admit that our proxy for investments in health capitalprivate health expenditures as a % of GDP -is not an ideal measure because it depends on other factors such as healthcare system design, healthcare policy etc. We hope to at least partly mitigate this problem by including fixed effects in every model. Yet, this conclusion warrants corroboration in further quantitative and qualitative research.
Conclusions and Policy Implications
Our results suggest that promoting simultaneously institutionalized political and economic competitiveness is crucial for improving health in the post-communist countries. We have shown empirically that, all else being equal, building institutions for political and economic competitiveness simultaneously results in the best health outcomes. Maintaining the assumption that uninstitutionalized competitiveness, either political or economic, leads to inferior social outcomes (e.g., corruption, clientelism, stagnation), we argue that building institutions for political and economic competition should go hand in hand in order to achieve Pareto-optimality in social outcomes, specifically, population health. Absence of one of the proposed institutions invariably impedes or even prevents completely the functioning of the other and thereby raises overall uncertainty. 'When governments are unconstrained by institutionalized competition, they (and the public officials within them) will structure economic institutions so as to maximize short-run government revenues and/or permit rent-seeking by public officials' (Haber, 2008, p. 48).
These processes reveal a strong positive and highly significant reinforcement effect upon different dimensions of health. The policy implications are clear. First, policy makers should not underestimate the role of institutions. Second, when designing policies, they should foresee the interaction effects of certain institutional choices so that a failure in one realm will not spillover to and nullify achievements in the other. Although some might think that the era of transitions has come to an end, the surprisingly stable "hybrid" regimes that lack institutionalization as well as recent events in Ukraine prove institutional building to be a bare necessity of the future rather than that of the past. If these countries are "stuck in transition" (EBRD Transition Report, 2013) and therefore surrounded by uncertainty, does it also mean that they are stuck with bad health?
Apart from this question, future studies should appreciate the fact that institutions do not exist in a vacuum and probably interact with other institutions, which defines or at least modifies their effect upon policy outcomes including population health. Moreover, other political and economic institutions that might influence the degree of economic and political competitiveness vary across post-communist countries, e.g., presidential versus parliamentary government systems, different electoral formulas, or different degrees of enforcement power vested into economic competition agencies. Also, our hypothesis can be tested on a broader cross-section time-series dataset.
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